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ABSTRACT
NICHOLAS CASTELLANOS: Indie Illness: An Evaluation of the Orphan Drug Act
(Under the direction of Dr. Joshua Hendrickson)
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 by
subtracting the cost of incentives for drug development from the estimated value created
by each drug in the form of quality-adjusted life-year gains. Data regarding costs of
incentives is retrieved from the FDA as well as a report released by the National
Organization for Rare Disorders. Data regarding value created by each drug is retrieved
from a Freedom of Information Act request to the FDA, the CEA registry, and a report
released by the US Department of Health and Human Sciences. Sufficient data was
available for a total of 16 drugs. The net average value created for the data set was $44.04
billion assuming 100% treatment scenario and $4.336 billion assuming 10% treatment
scenario. It is unclear whether the calculations performed in this study are indicative of
the Orphan Drug Designation program as a whole as the criteria for inclusion of data in
this study was nonrandom. More research is needed to determine a representative data
sample for orphan drugs in order to evaluate the Orphan Drug Act more fully.
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INTRODUCTION
There are currently over 7,000 rare diseases affecting a total of 30 million
Americans. A rare disease is defined as one for which the total disease prevalence does
not exceed 200,000 Americans. Additionally, rare diseases may be constituted by a
subset of a non rare disease given that the subset classification is medically plausible.
Orphan drugs are defined as those drugs developed for the treatment of rare diseases.
Orphan drugs may be indicated for the treatment of both rare and non rare diseases, and
many orphan drugs carry multiple indications (Office of the Commissioner, 2020).
The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 was passed as an incentive for the development of
additional orphan drugs, and prior to the passage of the Orphan Drug Act, an average of
only two orphan drugs were developed each year (Mikami, 2017). The Orphan Drug Act
in its current form provides incentives in the form of 25% tax credits on qualified human
clinical trials, application and program fee waivers, and up to seven years additional
exclusivity (Office of the Commissioner, 2020).
This study seeks to evaluate the Orphan Drug Act by calculating the value created
by each orphan drug in the form of life year benefits and subtracting from that value the
costs incurred by the FDA in the form of incentives for drug development.
Data regarding prevalence for each orphan indication is retrieved via a Freedom
of Information Act request to the FDA. Information on the quality adjusted life years
gained from each drug is obtained using the CEA registry search engine. The dollar
value of a statistical human life year as calculated by the US Department of Health and
1

Human Sciences is used in this study. Estimates of average orphan drug tax credits are
calculated using data from the National Organization of Rare Disorders. The value of a
drug application fee with clinical data waiver is obtained from the FDA website.
To calculate the net value created by each drug the sum of the average tax orphan
tax credit and application fee waiver is subtracted from each indication prevalence
multiplied by the quality-adjusted life-years gained from the associated drug and the
value of a statistical life year.
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Background
Modern medicine has changed the narrative on many of the most common
diseases. A routine infection can now be treated with any of a slate of antibiotics. For
example, new diabetes treatments are constantly being developed to suit the varied needs
and preferences of diabetic Americans. The free market has been responsible for a large
portion of medical innovation, but this economic mechanism works best for large patient
populations. 37.3 million Americans, or one out of every ten, has diabetes and $327
billion dollars are spent in medical costs on diabetes in America each year (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2022). This represents a huge market that invites
constant research and development because new treatments that are developed will
always have a market for buyers, and pharmaceutical companies will always be able to
recoup their investments. The problem is that many illnesses affect only a small number
of people. Treatments still require billions of dollars to be developed, even if their target
market is less than 50,000 people, and this is where the FDA steps in to bridge the gap
between American needs and pharmaceutical incentives to provide a broad spectrum of
treatments for a broad spectrum of health problems.
In America, rare diseases are defined as those affecting fewer than 200,000
people. The drugs created to treat these diseases are referred to as orphan drugs (Office of
the Commissioner, 2020). There are over 7,000 rare diseases affecting over 30 million
Americans, or roughly one in every ten Americans, but prior to 1983, only 38 orphan
drugs had been approved by the FDA (Office of the Commissioner, 2020; National

Organization for Rare Disorders, 2021). The story of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983,
which forever changed the economic environment in which orphan drugs are developed,
actually began in the late 1950s.
Thalidomide, a medication for treating nausea in pregnant women, became
extremely popular in the late 1950s, but it was not until the early 1960s that this
medication was found to have also caused severe birth defects in over ten thousand
children (Kim et al., 2011). Suffice to say, the whole debacle turned a lot of eyes towards
how the FDA approached medication quality and safety approvals. Ultimately, this led to
the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,
which strengthened the FDA’s approach to clinical trials and required drug developers to
submit an Investigational New Drug Notice on any new molecules they were
investigating (Mikami, 2017). This was of course, a very important step toward a world
where one can trust a medication indicated for nausea in pregnant women to not cause
birth defects in those same pregnant women, but it had an unintended impact on the way
pharmaceutical companies approached the viability of new molecules. Suddenly, it
became significantly more expensive (by way of increased trials, and application costs) to
investigate new drugs, and so the pharmaceutical companies assigned drugs for rare
diseases to the category of “low commercial priority,” and only ten orphan drugs were
approved in the entire decade leading up to the passage of the 1983 Orphan Drug Act
(Mikami, 2017).
In 1975, the FDA recognized the poor plight of “drugs of limited commercial
value” and resolved that something should be done to remedy this. Unfortunately, upon
examination of the issue, the FDA concluded that the reasons for this plight were too

varied and distinct for each illness and nothing could reasonably be done (Mikami, 2017).
Ultimately, it turned out to be the grassroots efforts of actual patients of rare diseases that
were the catalyst for government action. A patient support group for Huntington’s disease
(a rare disease impacting thirty thousand Americans) advocated for and ultimately
founded the Congressional Commission for the Control of Huntington’s Disease and Its
Consequences, which reported that there were no viable drugs for Huntington’s disease
or many other rare diseases in 1977 (Center for Neurological Treatment & Research,
2014; Mikami, 2017). This led to a 1978 FDA interagency task force that finally decided
some action was warranted, and identified the increased cost of FDA approval as the
issue. They suggested a program where companies could repay the approval and
application costs after getting marketing approval and were actually able to sell the
medication. They also suggested a new FDA board that would advocate for the
development of drugs for rare diseases on a mainly humanitarian basis (Mikami, 2017).
In 1980, a researcher and patient were unable to get 5-HTP, a treatment for
myoclonus, which caused the researcher to have to synthesize it himself in his lab. They
contacted their representative, congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, who proposed a bill
that outlined government actions “to assist in the development of drugs for diseases and
conditions of low incidence” (Mikami, 2017). The bill failed, but triggered a Los Angeles
Times article that was seen by Maurice Kluggman, an ordinary American except for two
important qualities. The first is that he had a rare form of cancer, which would have met
the criteria for a rare disease. The second is that his brother, Jack Kluggman, was the star
of a popular television program, Quincy M.E. This brought Jack Klugman to produce
multiple episodes about the tragic fate of Americans suffering from rare diseases, and this
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is seen by many as the major turning point in the fight for public opinion on orphan drugs
in America (Mikami, 2017).
Around the same time, a mother of a child with tourettes, who was unable to get
medication for her child because it was unavailable in America even though it had been
approved in Canada, contacted her representative, Henry Waxman. Waxman had
participated in the failed legislative attempt of 1980, but in 1981, Waxman submitted his
own bill, which would ultimately become the 1983 Orphan Drug Act (Mikami, 2017).
The Orphan Drug Act defines rare diseases as those affecting fewer than two
hundred thousand Americans, or those for which a pharmaceutical company could not
reasonably expect to recoup their investment in the development of treatments (Office of
the Commissioner, 2020). Pharmaceutical companies request orphan designations for
drugs treating conditions that they believe to meet these criteria from the FDA.
Designation is sought relatively early in the drug production process, as the benefits of
the Orphan Drug Act impact the clinical trials during drug development. The benefits of
orphan designation are as follows. First, the drug developers also receive a waiver for the
user fees incurred by the drug application. Second, pharmaceutical companies developing
orphan drugs receive tax credits for qualified human clinical testing. Third, drug
developers are also eligible for potentially seven additional years of exclusivity for their
orphan products (Office of the Commissioner, 2020).
The FDA expends a large amount of resources to approve, regulate, and
investigate applications for new drugs. This process is expedited in part by the existence
of user fees. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 authorized the FDA “to collect
fees from companies that produce certain human drug and biological products” in order
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to help fund and expedite the actions and duties of the FDA (Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, 2022). Every five years the PDUFA must be reauthorized; it is currently
authorized through September of 2022. The user fees are first broken down by whether or
not additional clinical data with respect to safety is required. For orphan drugs, the
majority are new molecules or formulations and therefore do require clinical testing with
respect to safety. The application fee without clinical data required is $1,558,609, and
with clinical data required it is $3,117,218 (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
2022). Program fees are also assessed for each pharmaceutical company. Each company
is “required to pay the annual prescription drug program fee for each prescription drug
product that is identified in such a human drug application approved” (Food and Drug
Administration et al., 2020). In 2022, the program fees were set at $369,413 each year per
drug product approved through the FDA (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
2022). The fee amounts change each year and are set such that application fees represent
20% of the FDA’s revenue and program fees represent 80% of the total revenue (Food
and Drug Administration, 2020). By virtue of orphan drug designation, participating
pharmaceutical companies are not required to pay program fees or application fees
corresponding to their drugs with orphan status.
The tax credit for qualified human clinical testing represents by far the greatest
monetary benefit for companies producing orphan drugs. In 2017, the tax credit was
halved from 50% to 25% of qualified human clinical testing (Knowledge Ecology
International, 2021). All drug research is eligible for some amount of tax credit through
research and development tax credits, but there are key differences between R&D tax
credits and those set out in the Orphan Drug Act. Under orphan drug tax credits,
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contractor costs can be claimed at 100% instead of the R&D 65%. Companies are also
eligible to recoup 25% of qualified research expenses under the orphan designation
compared to the 10% of research and development covered under the R&D tax credit.
Lastly, clinical trials that occur outside the U.S. are eligible for tax credits under orphan
designation while they are excluded under normal R&D regulations (Barka, 2022). The
orphan drug tax credits also extend to human clinical trials, which can represent a large
chunk of the overall costs of drug development, and are excluded from R&D tax credits.
Orphan drugs are also eligible for an additional seven years of exclusivity under
the Orphan Drug Act, but this part of the program is not always relevant. The orphan
drug exclusivity is given in addition to and runs concurrently with the patent exclusivity
that all drugs received by nature of being the product of research and innovation. The
patent for pharmaceutical drugs lasts for 20 years and begins at the drugs invention.
Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman act of 1984 increased the patent term for new chemical
entities by the number of years that the drug is reviewed plus half of the time that the
drug is in preclinical trials, and the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 extended the
exclusivity period of pediatric drugs by six months (Biotechnology Industry Organization
et al., 2015).
It takes an average of 12.5 years for a drug to go through all the clinical testing
and approval processes required to move from drug discovery to marketing approval
(Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., 2015). The up to seven years of orphan
designation associated exclusivity runs from the point of marketing approval, which
means that in the average case, orphan exclusivity runs for 19.5 years after drug
discovery compared to the patent that runs for 20 years (Biotechnology Industry
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Organization et al., 2015). The orphan drug exclusivity can still be useful to
pharmaceutical companies because orphan drug clinical testing takes longer than non
orphan drug clinical testing, and if the clinical testing runs significantly longer than the
average, the orphan designation associated exclusivity provides additional security that
the pharmaceutical company will have enough time to recoup its investment.
In 2018, 503 drugs had gained orphan status and subsequent approval. Out of that
group, 217 no longer had either patent protection or exclusivity from their orphan
designation. Of that 217, only 116 actually faced generic competition (IQVIA Institute
for Human Data Science et al., 2018). Orphan drugs are already in a market where
profitability can be tricky to attain, and so it makes sense that competing developers
would not always be incentivized to produce generic versions of orphan drugs.
Additionally, the exclusivity stemming from the orphan designation only lasted longer
than patent protection in 60 drugs, which represents 12% of cases (IQVIA Institute for
Human Data Science et al., 2018). This is not to say that the additional period of
exclusivity is useless or meaningless in regards to developer incentives and market
deterrents, but it is important to understand the limited impacts of the extended
exclusivity when actually worked out in the real world.
Drug developers are also able to gain orphan status for their drugs and targeted
illnesses even when the disease's prevalence exceeds 200,000 Americans by establishing
an orphan subset. The subset must, however, be medically plausible, which means that
drug use would be appropriate within the proposed orphan subset, but inappropriate
outside the subset due to mechanism of action, toxicity, cost, or some other reason (Food
and Drug Administration, 2013). Pharmaceutical companies can also gain separate
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approvals and orphan designations for the same drug, if the drug is indicated in the
treatment of multiple rare diseases (Food and Drug Administration, 2013). If the same
drug under a different formulation, for example, is to gain an additional orphan
designation, the drug manufacturer must demonstrate clinical superiority somehow (Food
and Drug Administration, 2013). Lastly, drugs can receive orphan status, while also being
indicated and approved for use in non orphan diseases (Food and Drug Administration,
2013).
The Orphan Drug Act is carried out by the FDA’s Office of Orphan Product
Development. The OOPD has an annual budget of $29,099,000. This money is used to
fund between 12 and 18 grant awards annually as well as to provide support and funding
for existing projects (Office of Orphan Products Development, 2018). The OOPD carries
out five roles under the FDA: the Humanitarian Use Device program, the Rare Pediatric
Disease program, the Orphan Products Grants program, the Pediatric Device Consortia
grants program, as well as the core role of designating and approving orphan drugs
(Office of Orphan Products Development, 2018). The Orphan Products Grants program
has funded 600 clinical trials, leading to 60 approvals of orphan products, which
represent 10% of all orphan drug approvals. In recent years, the capacity for the OOPD to
fund additional grants has decreased as the cost of conducting clinical trials has increased
much faster than the rate of medical inflation over all (Office of Orphan Products
Development, 2018).
The Orphan Drug Act in America is regarded by many as a successful piece of
legislation, and Orphan drugs now account for about one third of all newly approved
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drugs each year (Mikami, 2017). The Orphan Drug Act has inspired similar legislation in
Japan, Singapore, Australia, as well as Europe (Mikami, 2017).
The quality adjusted life year (QALY) is a measure of a drug's efficacy, and is
used in cost effectiveness analyses to determine the added overall health benefit
associated with a drug's use. The use of QALYs was not widespread until the 1960s, and
the practice got its start in calculations of the cost of nuclear shelters divided by the lives
that could be saved by sucha shelter (Spencer et al., 2022). In 1965, president Johnson
encouraged the Department of Health to take advantage of systems developed by the
Department of Defense, which led to the incorporation of the QALY into the healthcare
system of America (Spencer et al., 2022). The use of QALY is widespread in the UK
through the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, but the use of QALY is banned in
America for use in regards to Medicare coverage; however, the American Institute for
Clinical and Economic Review still advises coverage for Medicaid and commercial
health plans as well as pharmacy benefit managers (Kirkdale et al., 2010; Smith, 2019).
The QALY can be calculated by multiplying the health utility by the number of
years of life expectancy (Spencer et al., 2022). Health utility is a quantity that varies
between 0, meaning dead, and 1, meaning perfect health or cured. Values between 0 and
1 denote different qualities of life in a linear scale. Under the QALY system, ten years of
life lived at 0.1 health utility is equal to one year of life lived at perfect health or a health
utility value of 1.
The QALY is assessed via a number of means depending on the organization
conducting the cost effectiveness analysis. The UK’s National Institute for Clinical
Excellence uses the EuroQol EQ-5D questionnaire to assess QALY. The EQ-5D includes
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questions about daily activities, pain, depression and anxiety, self care, and mobility
among others. The patient's answers are converted to one of 243 distinct health states that
each correspond to a different numerical value for health utility between 0 and 1
(Kirkdale et al., 2010). Another way of assessing QALY is through a Time Trade Off
Questionnaire. The TTO includes questions where patients are asked to identify
preferences about theoretical health states and life expectancies:
“Imagine that you are told that you have 10 years left to live. In connection with
this you are also told that you can choose to live these 10 years in your current
health state or that you can choose to give up some life years to live for a shorter
period in full health. Indicate with a cross on the line the number of years in full
health that you think is of equal value to 10 years in your current health state
(Kirkdale et al., 2010).”
Once the change QALY for a given illness and a given treatment plan is assessed,
the cost of the treatment is divided by the total change in QALY to come up with the cost
per QALY afforded by that particular treatment. The cost per QALY is used by various
bodies to determine whether a given treatment is cost effective enough to be covered.
The incremental cost effectiveness ratio is equal to the difference in cost of the
new treatment relative to whatever treatment would be used otherwise divided by the
difference in QALY afforded by the new treatment relative to the QALY afforded by the
default treatment (National Council on Disability, 2019). ICER is another metric that
closely resembles cost per QALY and is also used in cost effectiveness analyses to
determine whether a given treatment is worth funding.
The American College of Cardiology and American Heart Association regards
ICER less than $50,000 per QALY as high value, ICER between $50,000 and $150,000
per QALY as intermediate value, and ICER greater than $150,000 per QALY as low
value (Dubois, 2016).
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The UK’s National Institute for Clinical Excellence will generally approve
treatments with a cost per QALY of up to 30,000 pounds per QALY (Kirkdale et al.,
2010). This converts to $39,437 per QALY.
America’s Institute for Clinical and Economic Review values one QALY at
between $50,000 and $150,000 (Smith, 2019).
In a literature review by Azimi and Welch, various cost effectiveness analyses
were evaluated to determine general consensus on an appropriate value for a QALY.
They found that below a value of $61,500 per QALY every cost effectiveness analysis
surveyed judged the treatments to be worth it. Between $61,500 and $166,000 per QALY
there was disagreement among cost effectiveness analyses (Azimi et al. 1998).
In 2018, CVS Caremark announced a new policy to allow pharmacy benefit
managers to exclude any drug with a cost per QALY greater than $100,000 per QALY
from their formularies; this action was taken with hopes that drug manufacturers would
lower prices in order to remain competitive (National Council on Disability, 2019).
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Literature Review
Pharmaceutical companies that produce orphan drugs, do so for small patient
populations, and as a consequence, charge extremely high prices for these life saving
medications. The average orphan drug costs five times more than the average non-orphan
drug per year, costing patients $150,854 and $33,654 per year respectively, with data
based on the mean values for the top 100 orphan and non orphan drugs in the US in 2018
(Chambers, 2020). As rare diseases continue to gain treatment options, there has also
been a shift in the medical economy towards the thirty million Americans suffering from
rare diseases. In 2021, 24.9% of U.S. prescription drug spending was on orphan drugs
(Chua et al., 2021). Other reasons contribute to the lucrative nature of orphan drugs,
including the nature of rare diseases. Most rare diseases are chronic and have a genetic
component, which ensures that the patient population for most orphan drugs is life long.
Additionally, 85-90% of known rare diseases are life threatening or serious, which means
that small patient populations can be reliably charged high prices because of low price
elasticity on the part of patients (Haffner, 2006).
In general, drug prices are set by pharmaceutical companies on a combination of
the consumer’s ability to pay and the desire to recoup research and development costs.
However, the small market for orphan drugs means that pharmaceutical companies set
prices with a greater emphasis on earning back research and development costs from a
small number of patients, with decreased attention paid to consumer ability to pay
(Srivastava, 2019). This combined with a low competition environment and high patient

need for the medications leads to an orphan drug market marked by such extreme price
increases.
The market environment is not the only notable difference between orphan and
non orphan drugs. The production process and associated costs also show divergence.
Clinical testing of pharmaceutical drugs involves three stages of clinical testing. Phase 1
generally tests the safety and unintended side effects of a drug, which also helps to
determine the optimal dose and timing. Phase 2 is the exploratory phase of clinical testing
and uses biomarkers as the chief marker of efficacy. Phase 3 relies on more long term
clinical outcomes, and is generally more costly than Phase 2 (Pateras et al., 2021). Each
phase represents a different standard for continuation of development for pharmaceutical
companies. 13.8% of drugs entering Phase 1 ever achieve marketing approval, which is
the final step of approval for pharmaceutical drugs in America. Additionally, 35.1% of
drugs entering Phase 2, and 59% of drugs entering Phase 3 ever achieve marketing
approval (Wouters et al., 2020).
Orphan drugs, by definition, are created for small patient populations, which can
make developing human clinical trials more difficult. One such extreme example is
Adagen. Adagen treats severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome involving
adenosine deaminase and only affects a total of 14 people in America. As a result, the
clinical trial for Adagen involved only 8 people (Haffner, 2006). The average clinical
study duration for orphan drugs is twice that for non orphan drugs. Additionally, orphan
drugs have a lower mean number of subjects than non orphan drugs for phases two and
three of human clinical trials (Jayasundara et al., 2019).

Even if the patient population is large enough for more typical clinical trials, as is
the case the majority of the time, patient populations are generally dispersed over a wide
range geographically, which can lend difficulty to the coordination of clinical trials. One
drug suffering from this problem had to be approved by 62 different institutional review
boards over a large number of hospitals just to ensure the sample population was large
enough for statistically significant results (Haffner, 2006).
For orphan drugs, Phase 1 trials are usually not required; additionally the second
and third phases can be combined if the patient population is sufficiently low (Srivastava,
2019). Additionally, there is often no requirement for a placebo arm in orphan drug trials
(Srivastava, 2019). Because the orphan drug designation has such a large impact on the
nature of human clinical testing, the application for orphan designation is generally
submitted before the Investigational New Drug application, although it can be submitted
at any point before the marketing application (Srivastava, 2019).
Jayasundara et al. (2019) investigated the costs of development for orphan vs non
orphan drugs throughout the process of human clinical testing, by comparing the data on
100 random orphan drugs with 100 random non orphan drugs. The out of pocket clinical
costs per approved orphan drug was 0.57 times the out-of-pocket clinical costs per
approved non orphan drug, amounting to $166 million and $291 million per approved
drug respectively (Jayasundara et al., 2019). The out of pocket clinical costs were
capitalized at 10.5% per annum, resulting in capitalized out of pocket costs for orphan
drugs at 0.71 times that of non orphan drugs, amounting to $291 million and $412 million
respectively (Jayasundara et al., 2019). 74 out of 100 orphan drugs investigated were new
molecular entities, compared to 54 out of 100 non orphan drugs. The term “new
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molecular entity” refers to drugs for which the active moiety has not been approved
previously by the FDA, as opposed to new chemical entities, for which the active moiety
has been previously approved. When only considering new molecular entities, the
capitalized costs for human clinical testing for orphan drugs was 0.50 times that of non
orphan drugs, amounting to $242 million and $489 million respectively (Jayasundara et
al., 2019). A number of factors contribute to this difference. First, the orphan drug
clinical trials included significantly fewer subjects for the second and third phases,
despite an estimated 2.5 times increased costs per patient for orphan drug trials. The
capitalized difference in costs was lower than the uncapitalized difference in part because
of the increased trial duration seen in orphan drug human clinical trials (Jayasundara et
al., 2019).
Altered standards for clinical testing coupled with financial incentives from the
FDA has led to a huge increase in the production of orphan drugs in recent years. In
2015, 21 new orphan drugs were approved by the FDA, representing 47% of new
approvals. The proportion decreased to 40% of new approvals in 2016 and only 29% of
approvals in 2020, but this still represents a comparatively large portion of drug
approvals when considering the small associated patient populations (Tribble, 2017). As
a result of this steady flow of new orphan drug development, there has been a huge
improvement in prognosis for patients suffering from rare diseases. Before the Orphan
Drug Act was passed in 1983, the rate of deaths from rare diseases was growing at a rate
of 2% per year relative to only 1.2% for other diseases. Between 1983 and 1993, deaths
from rare diseases actually declined at a rate of 3.1% compared to deaths from other
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diseases continuing to increase at a rate of 1.3% per year (Biotechnology Industry
Organization et al., 2015).
Despite this, 95% of Americans with rare diseases were still without options for
treatment as of 2018 (Gerry, 2018). Out of 7,000 rare diseases, only 289 have at least one
treatment option available (Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., 2015). However,
33% of marketing applications sent to the FDA are for orphan drugs, and 35% of Phase 3
trials are also for drugs with orphan designations (Wehrwein, 2021).
This discrepancy in part stems from the type of orphan drugs that become
especially successful. Some diseases draw the majority of new development. For
example, there were 30 different drugs available for hemophilia in 2021 (Wehrwein,
2021). Seven out of the ten top selling drugs in America have at least one orphan
designation (Socal et al., 2020). Drugs already approved for non-rare diseases must still
go through the approval process for additional indications, including rare diseases. They
are also still eligible for the benefits associated with orphan drugs.
In a study by Socal et al., out of 86 orphan drugs, for which researchers were able
to obtain prevalence data, there was an average of 2.7 orphan indications per drug (Socal
et al., 2020). Of this sample, 21 drugs, or 24.4% had combined patient populations
between each indication that amounted to more than the 200 thousand population
threshold set out by the FDA as a definition for rare diseases (Socal et al., 2020).
Additionally, 18 drugs, or 20.9%, had at least one non orphan approval, which
automatically increases the total patient population significantly beyond the orphan
threshold (Socal et al., 2020). In 2017, there were 70 orphan drugs that first gained
approval for mass market use and only subsequently gained orphan designations and
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benefits (Tribble, 2017). One notable example is Botox, which started out only indicated
for treatment of eye muscle spasms and now is indicated for treatment of three rare
diseases (Tribble, 2017). Another example of orphan drugs contradicting the idea behind
the Orphan Drug Act is Amgen’s Repatha. In 2015, Amgen Inc. achieved approval for
two designations on the same day. The first was a rare disease, homozygous familial
hypercholesterolemia, which affects only 300 people. The second was uncontrolled levels
of LDL cholesterol, which affects over 11 million people (Tribble, 2017).
As a result of this lopsided economy, only 38.6% of spending on orphan drugs is
actually for orphan indications (Chua et al., 2021). The non orphan spending is either
directed towards indications for non-rare diseases or in many cases towards off-label
indications. In a study by Kesselheim et al. on three of the four top selling orphan drugs
in 2012, lidocaine patches, modafinil, and cinacalcet, the rate of orphan on label uses rose
at rates of 3.12, 0.24, and .03 patients per month respectively. This was much lower than
the rate of non orphan off label uses that rose at rates of 14.6, 1.45, and 1.58 patients per
month respectively, which shows that while drugs can receive orphan indications, often
the off-label use exceeds the on-label orphan use (Kesselheim et al., 2012).
Pharmaceutical companies that produce orphan drugs often apply for and receive
additional orphan indications. It is important to note that orphan drugs are only eligible to
receive up to seven years in marketing exclusivity, and it is at the discretion of the FDA
to decide how many years of marketing exclusivity to give with each orphan designation.
However, drugs are eligible for additional years of market exclusivity with additional
orphan designations. Orphan drugs that received a second orphan designation on average
received 4.7 additional years of marketing exclusivity (Padula et al., 2018). The third
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orphan designation resulted in an average of 3.1 additional years of marketing exclusivity
(Padula et al., 2018). The fourth and fifth orphan designations were associated with an
average increase of 2.7 and 2.9 additional years of exclusivity, respectively (Padula et al.,
2018).
In a study conducted by the National Organization for Rare Disorders, the average
cost of development of orphan drugs as well as the impact of the orphan designation
associated tax credit was calculated in 2015. The average out-of-pocket cost of
preclinical trials for drug development was $233 million for established drug developers.
The out of pocket costs for phase one, two, and three of clinical trials were $126 million,
$123 million, and $176 million, respectively (Biotechnology Industry Organization et al.,
2015). All drug development is eligible for some form of tax credit from the government
in the form of research and development tax credits. A pharmaceutical company
producing an orphan drug will take advantage of both research and development and
orphan drug tax credits at different stages of drug development. The research and
development tax credit is applied to preclinical testing, and the orphan drug tax credit is
applied to human clinical testing. When calculating the value of the tax credit, the time
value of money as well as the company's cost of capital were taken into account to come
up with the present value of the tax credit to the pharmaceutical company. The average
present value of the research and development tax credit was $11.3 million, and the
average present value of the total orphan drug tax credit was $138.8 million
(Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., 2015). In the non-orphan drug scenario, the
orphan drug tax credit is unavailable, but out of pocket costs for human clinical testing
are still eligible for the research and development tax credit. The value of the increased
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research and development tax credit was calculated to be one tenth of the value of the lost
orphan drug tax credit; the total present value of the research and development tax credit
for non-orphan drugs was calculated to be $28 million. It is important to note that this
study was conducted in 2015, which was two years before the orphan drug tax credit was
reduced from 50% to 25% of qualified human clinical testing. The average present value
of out of pocket costs for drug development, including research and preclinical as well as
clinical testing, was calculated to be $466.3 million. The net out of pocket costs for
orphan drug development after tax credits was calculated to be $316.1 million, and the
net out of pocket costs for non-orphan drug development after tax credits was calculated
to be $438.3 million (Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., 2015).
For unestablished, premarket drug developers, the increased value of tax credits
for orphan drugs relative to non orphan drugs was calculated to be $101.6 million,
because premarket drug developers do not have the same ability to access tax credits
before drug production (Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., 2015). Drug
developers can apply the tax credit to the prior year or over a period of as much as 20
years to future taxes (Nuventra, 2022). This is especially useful for premarket drug
developers, because they may not owe enough taxes prior to drug development to take
advantage of the tax credits.
As previously discussed, the ultimate value provided by pharmaceutical drugs can
be measured in QALYs. In new chemical entities approved by the FDA between 1997
and 2015, orphan drugs had a median QALY gain of 0.25, while non-orphan drugs had a
median QALY gain of 0.05 (Chambers et al., 2020). Additionally, 45% of orphan drugs
afforded a cost per QALY of at least $150,000 per QALY, while only 21% of non-orphan
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drugs exceeded this threshold (Chambers et al., 2020). The median cost per QALY for
orphan drugs in this period was $276,288 per QALY, while non-orphan drugs in this
period had a median cost per QALY of $100,360 per QALY (Chambers et al., 2020).
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Methodology and Results
It is important when evaluating government programs to understand whether or
not the benefits created by the program outweigh the costs created by the program. When
considering the value created by a program like the Orphan Drug Act, it is useful to
determine the value created by the drugs themselves. Pharmaceutical drugs create value
for American citizens in the form of health benefits, which can be estimated as qualityadjusted life-years. The value created by the Orphan Drug Act can therefore be estimated
to be the total amount of quality-adjusted life-year benefits experienced by all patients
taking orphan drugs. Because the FDA expends significant capital in incentivizing the
creation of these benefits, it is also worthwhile to gain an estimate of what the costs are
for the incentivization of each drug’s development. The FDA expends dollar amounts for
two of the three orphan drug benefits, user fee waivers and orphan tax credits, which can
be estimated and added together to gain an estimated total cost per drug expended by the
FDA. The net value created can then be understood to be the difference between the
benefits and the costs associated with the program.
In order to determine the value created by each orphan drug in dollars, the
prevalence of each indication is multiplied by the quality-adjusted life-year gains for each
drug and the value of a statistical life year. The cost incurred by the FDA in incentivising
each drug is calculated by adding the average added orphan tax credit to the value of a
drug application with clinical data waiver. The net value created by each orphan drug is

calculated by subtracting the costs incurred by the FDA from the value created by each
drug.
In order to determine the Value of a Statistical Life Year, this study relies on
calculations performed by the US Department of Health and Human Services that
released a report in 2016 providing guidelines for regulatory impact studies. Often, the
value of a statistical life and the Value of a Statistical Life Year are chiefly relevant in
cases where risk of fatality is altered somehow in order to assign monetary values to risk
increases or risk reductions. The basis of the report was six studies on revealed
preferences with the value of a statistical life report from $4.4 million to $14.2 million
with a midpoint of $9.3 million in 2014 dollars (Robinson et al., 2016). To determine the
value of an individual statistical life year, the total value was divided out across the life
span and then a 3% discount rate was applied to future years, yielding a central estimate
of $490 thousand in 2014 dollars per life year (Robinson et al., 2016). This value can be
converted to $548 thousand in 2022 dollars per year.
Due to the 2017 modifications to the Orphan Drug Act, as well as the usage of
2022 user fee amounts, all dollar amounts that are not reported in 2022 dollars are
converted to 2022 dollars for calculations performed in this study.
In order to calculate the Ideal Value Created by each orphan drug (IVC) for which
data was obtained, the Value of a Statistical Life Year (VSLY) is multiplied by the
Quality-Adjusted Life Year Gains (QALYG) associated with the drug and the total
United States prevalence of the drug (Prev).

IVC = VSLY x QALYG x Prev

Because rare diseases are less common, it takes an average of 7.6 years for
patients with rare diseases to receive the correct diagnosis (Biotechnology Industry
Organization & National Organization for Rare Disorders, 2015). Furthermore, the
treated population of rare diseases only represents on average 10% of the total prevalence
of the disease due to a lack of public awareness regarding many rare diseases (IQVIA
Institute for Human Data Science & National Organization for Rare Disorders, 2018).
The estimated 10% treatment rate is converted to a factor of 0.1 for the purposes of this
study. To calculate the Real Value Created by each drug (RVC), the Ideal Value Created
is multiplied by a factor of 0.1 to account for inefficiencies in terms of diagnosis and
treatment.

RVC = IVC x 0.1
The main data used in this study was acquired from the FDA’s Office of Orphan
Medical Products. Scans of orphan designation applications were obtained via a freedom
of information request submitted through the online FDA FOIA request form. In total, the
orphan designation applications for 85 designation-drug combinations were obtained in
redacted form. As a rule, orphan drug designation applications must include data
regarding national prevalence in order to prove that the associated rare disease does not
affect more than 200,000 Americans. The applications must also include calculations
explaining and supporting the claimed prevalence data. The prevalence data, as well as
drug name and indication, were obtained from each orphan designation application.
The basis for inclusion of different drug applications in the response to the
Freedom of Information Act request was applications that the FDA already had prepared
in response to other freedom of information requests. As a result, it is unlikely that the
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data from the obtained 85 orphan designation applications are completely representative
of orphan designation applications as a whole, as their inclusion was non random.
The value created by orphan drugs for individual consumers is measured in this
study using quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). Data regarding quality adjusted life
years and price per quality adjusted life years were obtained through the Cost
Effectiveness Analysis Registry of the Tufts Medical Center, which “is a comprehensive
database of >10,000 cost-utility analyses on a wide variety of diseases and treatments
published from 1976 to the present (Tufts Medical Center, 2018).”
The generic and brand names were obtained from each orphan application and
were both searched via the methods section of the CEA registry search engine, which
yielded results in the form of articles published by the National Center for Biotechnical
Information. Quality-adjusted life-year data is presented as a relative value. In cases
where another drug for the indication already exists and is commonly used to treat the
rare disease, the Quality-Adjusted Life-Year Gains are reported relative to the QualityAdjusted Life-Year gains of that preexisting treatment. In cases where such a drug does
not exist, quality adjusted life year data is reported relative to best supportive care.
Data regarding cost effectiveness was available for 20 of the 85 drugs, for which
applications were received from the FDA. Of that subset, data regarding raw quality
adjusted life year gains was available for 16 drugs.
The QALY and prevalence values for each drug are reported in Table 1.
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Table 1. Drug name, indication, indication prevalence, and drug efficacy
Drug

Indication

Prev

QALYG

Afatinib

EGFR-mutation positive NSCLC

24086

1.36

Xalkalori (crizotinib)

c-MET/ROS/ALK positive locally
advanced/metastatic NSCLC

197205 2.68

Epidiolex (cannabidiol)

Lennox-Gastaut syndrome

82290

0.7

Esbriet (pirfenidone)

idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis

41990

3.318

Kalydeco (ivacaftor)

cystic fibrosis

30000

6.8

Nexavar (sorafenib)

renal cell carcinoma

162472 0.27

Ultomiris (ravulizumabcwvz)

paroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria

463

1.67

Riluzole

amyotrophic lateral schlerosis

22540

0.182

Somatropin

human growth hormone deficiency

14286

3.25

Somavert (pegvisomant)

acromegaly

18946

0.15

Stivarga (regorafenib)

metastatic/unresectable gastrointestinal
stromal tumors

8506

0.42

Stivarga’ (regorafenib)

hepatocellular carcinoma

29968

0.18

Tafinlar (dabrafenib)

V600-positive stage IIb-IV melanoma
(advanced/metastatic)

93913

0.1565

Tukysa (tucatinib)

HER2 positive breast cancer with brain
metastases

19375

0.21

Actemra (tocilizumab)

juvenile ideopathic arthritis

24000

0.23

Natpara (recombinant
parathyroid hormone)

hypoparathyroidism

66500

0.94
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The value created by orphan drugs is achieved by incentives funded through the
FDA to encourage development of orphan drugs. The FDA incentivizes orphan drug
development through improved tax credits for qualified human clinical trials, application
and program fee waivers, and up to seven years exclusivity.
The Total FDA Expenditure per drug (TE) is calculated by adding the Current
Added Orphan Tax Credit to the application fee (AF) with clinical data.

TE = CATC + AF
In 2017, the orphan tax credit changed from 50% to 25% of qualified human
clinical testing (Knowledge Ecology International, 2021). Because the Preliminary
Added Orphan Tax Credit was calculated in 2015 based on 2015 policies, it must be
multiplied by 0.5 to achieve the Current Added Orphan Tax Credit (CATC). The new tax
credit will be used for calculations of value exchanged even for drugs for which the
applications were submitted prior to 2017 because the purpose of this analysis is to
determine the value of the orphan drug program going forward.

CATC = PATC x 0.5
The Preliminary Added Orphan Tax Credit (PATC) is calculated by subtracting
the average non-orphan total tax credit (NODATC) from the average orphan total tax
credit (ODATC).

PATC = ODATC - NODATC
The Net Real Value Created (NRVC) and Net Ideal Value Created (NIVC) for a
given drug are calculated by subtracting the Total FDA Expenditure for the drug from the
Real Value Created and Ideal Value Created, respectively.
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NIVC = IVC - TE
NRVC = RVC - TE
The cost expended by the FDA through application and program fee waivers was
determined through the FDA’s website. The application and program fees are updated
annually, so 2022 fees were obtained and are used in this analysis. The application fees
for drugs where clinical data is required are used in this analysis and amount to
$3,117,218 per drug application (AF) (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 2022).
The FDA waives this fee for orphan designated drugs, and so it can be counted as an
expense on the part of the FDA in order to encourage orphan drug production. For the
purposes of this study, the program fee waiver will not be included as it is an annual fee
accrued for each drug a pharmaceutical company is currently producing and it represents
a very small portion of the benefits provided by the FDA.
The cost expended by the FDA through tax credits for qualified human clinical
testing were estimated based on data from the National Organization for Rare Disorders
report: “Impact of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit on Treatments for Rare Diseases.”
Because orphan drug tax credits cannot be doubly applied to expenses also used for
research and development tax credits, the value of the orphan drug tax credits is reported
as the difference in tax credit between a scenario with only research and development tax
credits and a scenario with both research and development as well as orphan drug tax
credits applied to different expenses. These values were calculated separately for
established and non-established drug developers; although for the purposes of this
analysis, the established drug developer estimate will be used.
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The research and development tax credit for orphan drugs amounts to an average
of $11.3 million when used in conjunction with the orphan drug tax credit, which
amounts to an average of $138.3 million; both values are reported as a present value
using a 5% discount rate. The total average tax credit for the orphan drug scenario
(ODATC) is therefore $149.6 million. In the non orphan drug scenario, where only the
research and development tax credit may be applied, the average total present value tax
credit is valued at $28.0 million (NODATC), also calculated with a discount rate of 5%
(Biotechnology Industry Organization & National Organization for Rare Disorders,
2015).
The difference between the two tax credits is the Preliminary Added Orphan Tax
Credit and amounts to $145.7 million in 2022 dollars. After adjusting for current policy,
calculations yield a Current Added Orphan Tax Credit of $72.85 million in 2022 dollars.
The Total FDA Expenditure per drug is the combination of Current Added Orphan Tax
Credit and Application Fees, which amounts to $75,967,218 per drug indication, which is
reported in Table 2, along with the Ideal Value Created and Real Value Created as well
as the Net Ideal Value Created and Net Real Value Created for each drug.
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Table 2. Drug name, Ideal and Real Value Created, Net Ideal and Real Value Created
Drug

IVC
(billions)

RVC
(billions)

NIVC
(billions)

NRVC
(billions)

Afatinib

17.95

1.795

17.87

1.719

Xalkalori (crizotinib)

289.6

28.96

289.52

28.88

Epidiolex (cannabidiol)

31.57

3.157

31.49

3.081

Esbriet (pirfenidone)

76.35

7.635

76.27

7.559

Kalydeco (ivacaftor)

111.8

11.18

111.72

11.10

Nexavar (sorafenib)

24.04

2.404

23.96

2.328

Ultomiris (RavulizumabCWVZ)

.4237

.04237

.3477

-.0336

Riluzole

2.248

.2248

2.172

.1488

Somatropin

25.44

2.544

25.36

2.468

Somavert (pegvisomant)

1.557

.1557

1.481

.0797

Stivarga (regorafenib)

1.958

.1958

1.882

.1198

Stivarga' (regorafenib)

2.956

.2956

2.880

.2196

Tafinlar (dabrafenib)

80.54

8.054

80.46

7.978

Tukysa (tucatinib)

2.230

.2230

2.154

.1470

Actemra (tocilizumab)

3.025

.3025

2.949

.2265

Natpara (recombinant
parathyroid hormone)

34.26

3.426

34.18

3.350

Average

44.12

4.412

44.04

4.336

Total

705.95

70.595

704.70

69.371
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The drug with the largest net value created is ivacaftor, the brand name for which
is Kalydeco. Ivacaftor is designated to treat cystic fibrosis, which is an autosomal
recessive disorder that impacts mucus production in airways (Shteinberg et al., 2021).
Ivacaftor treats cystic fibrosis by altering activity of the cystic fibrosis transmembrane
conductance regulator, which is the protein impacted by the cystic fibrosis gene (Condren
et al., 2013). Cystic fibrosis has an estimated prevalence of 30,000 Americans, and
ivacaftor usage results in an average gain of 6.8 quality adjusted life years in cystic
fibrosis patients (Wherry, 2020). Ivacaftor has a net ideal value created of $111.72 billion
and a net real value created of $11.10 billion.
The one drug included in the study with a negative net real value created is
ravulizumab-cwyz, the brand name for which is Ultomiris. Ravulizumab-cwyz is
designated to treat paroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria, which is a disease of bone
marrow failure that results in low blood cell counts and blood cell blockage of veins and
arteries (Brodsky, 2014). Paroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria has a prevalence of 463
Americans, and ravulizumab-cwyz usage results in an average gain of 1.67 quality
adjusted life years (O’Connell et al., 2020). Ravulizumab-cwyz has a net ideal value
created of $.3477 billion and a net real value created of negative $.0336 billion.
The average net ideal value created for the 16 drugs included in this study is
$44.04 billion, and the average net real value created is $4.336 billion dollars.
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Conclusion
This study set out to evaluate the Orphan Drug Act by calculating the value
created by drugs, the development of which was facilitated by incentives associated with
the Orphan Drug Act. The drug applications for 86 drugs were retrieved from the FDA
via a freedom of information request, and the prevalence data for each rare disease
indication was recorded. The generic and brand names for each drug were then searched
on the CEA registry search engine, and QALY data was available for 16 drug indication
pairs. The value of a statistical life year was calculated using estimates performed by the
US Department of Health and Human Services. The value of a statistical life year was
multiplied by the quality adjusted life year gains associated with each drug and the
prevalence of the drug indication to calculate an estimated value created by each drug’s
development.
The net value created by each drug was calculated by subtracting the costs
expended by the FDA in funding orphan drug incentives from the value created by each
drug. The costs expended by the FDA for each drug consist of application fee waivers
and tax credits. The data for application fees with clinical data required in 2022 was
retrieved from the FDA website. The average orphan tax credit was calculated by
adjusting data from a study conducted by the National Organization for Rare Disorders to
the new, lower tax credit for 2022. The average tax credit was added to the application
fee waiver to calculate the average cost expended by the FDA in incentivizing orphan
drug development.

The average net value created for the data set was $44.04 billion assuming 100%
of the disease population is treated and $4.336 billion assuming 10% of the disease
population is treated. A back of the envelope calculation, extrapolating from these
average values, yields an estimated total net value created by the Orphan Drug Act of
$45.76 trillion assuming 100% treatment for every orphan drug and $4.505 trillion
assuming an average of 10% of each disease population is treated (IQVIA Institute for
Human Data Science, 2020). It is unclear how relevant these estimates are as the
inclusion for drugs in this study was doubly nonrandom. Furthermore, sufficient data was
only available for 16 out of an estimated 1039 drug indication pairs (IQVIA Institute for
Human Data Science, 2020). The first degree of nonrandomness comes from the FDA’s
response to the Freedom of Information Act request. The criteria for inclusion in the
response to the Freedom of Information Act request was that the FDA has already
gathered and redacted the application files in response to other freedom of information
requests. The second degree of nonrandomness comes from the availability of quality
adjusted life year data. Data regarding quality adjusted life years was not available for 70
out of 86 drug indication pairs on the CEA registry. It is unclear whether these limitations
imply the estimates performed here would be an overestimate or an underestimate of the
actual values.
Chief limitations in this study were the availability of application data from the
FDA as well as the existence of quality adjusted life year data on a minority of orphan
drugs. Future research should explore ways of either collecting data on a larger sample of
orphan drugs or ensuring that the data used is random and representative of the whole
sample. Given time and resource limitations, these hurdles were unable to be surmounted

in the conduction of this study. However, the calculations performed in this study provide
a basis and beginning estimate for the range of values created by orphan drugs and their
relationship to the costs of incentives provided by the FDA.
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